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Early in 2014, the Dutch railway system spiralled out of control after traffic management was confronted with the 
decision to take four double switches and two rail tracks out of service. A lack of coordination between the responsible 
teams resulted in the decision to stop all traffic in one of the busiest parts of the network during the rush hour.  In this 
study we aim to understand why the teams in the Dutch railway system were not able to adopt a coordinated approach 
to reschedule rail services. To answer this question, we used a mixed-method approach by combining dynamic network 
analysis (DNA) with sensemaking. Our analyses show that a diverging framing of the situation accumulated over time, 
leading to inconsistent actions, incorrect assumptions and a lack of effective communication. Informal and indirect 
communication spurred uncertainty and promoted negative emotions, which eventually resulted in a conflict between 
the actors. We discuss the difficulties of managing ambiguous events in multi-team systems.   
Keywords: Coordination; sensemaking; communication; railway; Dynamic Network Analysis; complex 
system disruptions 
1. Introduction
Early in 2014 the Dutch railway system spiralled out of control after the rail infrastructure 
manager decided to take four double switches and two rail tracks out of service. This decision was 
taken early in the afternoon by the responsible track team who thought that the equipment no 
longer met the authority’s safety standards. These switches and tracks are located at three of the 
busiest train stations in the Netherlands in two different rail traffic control areas (from here on: 
areas A and B). Since their decision would have a huge impact on the train service, the track team 
decided to give the other teams several hours of preparation time. Regardless, what should have 
been a coordinated procedure, resulted in a loss of control. While the train dispatchers in area B 
managed the process adequately, train dispatchers in area A decided to stop the entire service 
during peak hours. Many passengers were stranded, which drew negative attention from the 
media and politicians. We aim to answer the following research questions: Why were the actors in 
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the railway system unable to adopt a coordinated approach in order to adjust operations, and what 
explains the difference in response between the traffic control centres of areas A and B?    
Like many other critical infrastructures (CIs) in Europe, the Dutch railway system has 
undergone major changes over the past decades under the influence of EU policies. The Dutch 
railway system has changed from a mostly large-scale integrated monopoly into a networked 
system consisting of multiple private and public organizations with diverging goals and 
specialized tasks, which may be conflicting (De Bruijne & Van Eeten, 2007; Schulman, Roe, Eeten, & Bruijne, 2004). Providing reliable services therefore requires multiple teams, who are separated 
by organizational and geographical boundaries, to continuously negotiate and renegotiate issues 
related to reliability (De Bruijne, 2006). However, this network of teams poses additional 
challenges in terms of coordination and communication. For example, studies have found that 
geographically dispersed teams have difficulties in distributing information evenly, accurately, 
and in time (Hinds & McGrath, 2006). We are therefore interested in how actors in such networks 
communicate. To study the flows of information, we used social network analysis tools, more 
specifically Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA).  
The premise for this research is that coordination problems aren’t just the result of 
deficiencies in the quantity of information flows. Given the contextual differences in which people 
are working and their differences with regard to knowledge, goals and expertise, there is a 
considerable chance that information will be interpreted differently (Vlaar, van Fenema, & Tiwari, 2008). This could lead to different understandings of specific situations and therefore to potential 
conflicts regarding the course of actions to be followed. Successful coordination stems from a 
congruent framing of a situation (Cornelissen, Mantere, & Vaara, 2014). Consequently, the 
structural dimensions of communication need to be studied in conjunction with the attribution of 
meaning in order to understand coordination in a network of diverse teams. In this study we 
therefore combined DNA with theories of sensemaking to understand how information is 
processed within and among actors in order to understand how their actions made sense to them 
at that time (Dekker, 2006; Muhren, Eede, & Van de Walle, 2008).  
This research contributes to the literature in three areas. First, we extend coordination 
beyond individual actors or collocated groups and look at coordination on the level of the whole 
network of geographically and organizationally separated teams, something which has received 
little attention (Gittell & Weiss, 2004; Zaccaro, Marks, & DeChurch, 2012). Second, we use a 
mixed-method approach by combining Dynamic Network Analysis with an analysis of 
sensemaking. Third, we answer the call for the integration of time dynamics into network studies 
using DNA, to see how the structure of the inter-organizational network changes over time and 
how the relative importance of actors within the network changes (Abbasi & Kapucu, 2012; Wolbers, Groenewegen, Mollee, & Bím, 2013).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We will discuss the dynamics of 
communication and sensemaking in network coordination in section 2. The mixed methodology 
is explained in Section 3, followed by an introduction to the case in Section 4. We will identify key 
moments and actors by looking at communication patterns in Section 5. The case is analyzed in 
Section 6. The discussion and conclusions are presented in sections 7 and 8.   
2. Coordination and sensemaking between teams
Coordination can be achieved through pre-defined plans and procedures, but these formal 
modes of coordination are not always able to deal with the dynamics and uncertainty of specific 
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situations and may severely limit the flexibility of organizations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Johansson & Hollnagel, 2007). Adjusting to uncertain situations requires actors to mutually adapt 
and collectively improvise (Cornelissen et al., 2014). Communication plays a crucial role in the 
coordination of actions. Especially rich informal communication has been identified as one of the 
most important sources of resilient system performance (Roe & Schulman, 2008). Regular 
information updates to other team members help to create and maintain a shared understanding 
of problems and the actions needed to tackle them (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2013). Thus, 
accurate information updates should be provided regularly and on time (Gittell & Weiss, 2004).  
While previous researchers emphasized the importance of effective communication for 
successful coordination, they also found that geographically distributed teams face greater 
obstacles in sharing information effectively. Since communication between distributed teams is 
often technology-mediated, the information flows in these processes are restricted (e.g. number of 
communication lines) and the updating of information suffers from delays (Salas, Burke, & 
Samman, 2001). As Hinds & McGrath (2008) describe, distributed work settings lead to less 
informal and spontaneous communication in comparison to teams that are collocated. People 
working at different locations will also have different information assumptions, preferences and 
constraints (Vlaar et al., 2008). Consequently, information is often distributed unevenly and 
communication patterns can be quite unpredictable (Powell, Piccoli, & Ives, 2004). Moreover, 
since information flows and format are mediated by technology, important visual and social cues 
associated with traditional face-to-face interaction methods that help to interpret communication 
and team members’ actions are absent (Fiore, Salas, Cuevas, & Bowers, 2003). In short, 
challenges of understanding and communication are more salient in a network of diverse teams, 
which could result in the development of a different framing of situations.   
It is therefore important that the communicating parties can reach at least a congruent or 
compatible shared understanding during non-routine situations, (Fiore et al., 2003). Following 
Wolbers & Boersma (2013), we see this act of creating a sufficiently shared understanding as a 
process of sensemaking. Sensemaking means that actors try to understand events that are novel, 
ambiguous or contrary to expectations. They deal with this ambiguity or uncertainty by creating 
plausible interpretations of reality through the extraction of cues from their environment to create 
an initial sense of the situation (Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2014; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Cues trigger sensemaking as they indicate a 
discrepancy in the ongoing flow of events, which creates uncertainty about how to act. Actors then 
try to interpret and explain these surprising events by placing these cues in a mental model or 
frames of roles, rules, procedures and authority relations (Weick, 1993). These frames thus play 
an important role in terms of coordination as they trigger specific activities and expectations 
regarding the behaviour of others (Cornelissen et al., 2014). Finally, the sense made of the 
situation has to be put into action, to see whether it restores the interrupted event or if it is 
necessary to revise the interpretation. Sensemaking is therefore essentially an episodic process that 
occurs from the moment organizational activities are interrupted until they are restored or 
permanently interrupted and contains three recurrent steps: noticing and bracketing cues from 
the environment, creating interpretations and action taking (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; 
Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2014). 
Sensemaking is a social process because actors interpret their environment in and through 
interactions with each other, thereby constructing shared accounts that allow them to 
comprehend the world and act collectively (Maitlis, 2005). Actors can therefore influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others, a process that is called sensegiving (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991). Actors can also actively demand information and clarification, which is called 
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sensedemanding (Vlaar et al., 2008). As Cornelissen et al. (2014) put it, successful or failed 
coordination depends on how actors individually and collectively frame and reframe situations as 
a basis for action. These accounts don’t have to be completely overlapping, but they should be 
equivalent enough to allow coordinated action (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). However, the 
creation of a shared understanding is a difficult task that requires much effort and interaction 
(Bechky, 2003). The responses to violated expectations or ambiguous events depend on a variety of 
factors, e.g. individual, social, or organizational identity and personal and strategic goals (Maitlis 
& Christianson, 2014). This means that sensemaking is tied to individuals and that meaning in 
organizations is often contested because of the different positions, interests and backgrounds of 
actors (Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008).  
To sum up, coordination in a network of diverse teams requires both effective information 
sharing and acts of collective sensemaking in order to create a sufficient shared understanding of 
the task situation. In this study we therefore combined Dynamic Network Analysis to capture the 
flows of information with a qualitative analysis of how this information is processed by the actors. 
In the next section we will explain how we gathered and analyzed the data for both the DNA and 
the sensemaking process and how we combined both methods.   
3. Research methodology
We obtained recordings of all telephone conversations between all actors involved in the 
disruption. From these recordings, we selected the calls in which information on the switches and 
tracks was shared between actors. These recordings were transcribed (156 telephone calls in total). 
In addition, we carried out 9 in–depth interviews with actors involved in the case. Respondents 
were selected on the basis of their different roles and their geographically different locations. The 
interviews were used to reconstruct the events of the day from their respective locations. All 
interviews were transcribed. We also studied all relevant written documents, such as shift reports, 
e-mail conversations and logs. Finally, we attended a meeting during which actors reconstructed 
the day and shared their perspectives on the events. We observed this meeting and took detailed 
notes.  
In order to reconstruct the network, it is necessary to know “who talks to whom and at what 
time”. The telephone recordings offer rich and complete network data. Most of the files included 
information on the specific actors communicating and the time of communication. We 
transcribed the recordings and then translated them into numerical data. Using these data, we 
created an edge list containing the sources and targets of information flows and the time of 
communication. The telephone conversations don’t cover the communication between actors 
located in the same room. The interviews and documents fill in this data-gap.  
Next, we created six time slices, each lasting half an hour, following the example of Wolbers 
et al. (2013). Comparison of the different time slices shows how the network evolved over time. 
We found that a thirty-minute time interval offered us enough detail to show the general 
communication dynamics. We also created a two-mode network that shows which actors (mode 1) 
were involved during certain time periods (mode 2) of the process. The two-mode network was 
recorded as an incidence matrix, marking the presence (1) or absence (0) of actors in the different 
time periods (seen as events). The relationship between the two modes shows how many actors 
were actively communicating during each specific period of time. To show the relative importance 
of a time slice, we divided the number of actors in a time slice by the maximum number of actors 
(Borgatti & Halgin, 2011).  This two-mode analysis required us to use time slices of fifteen 
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minutes in order to obtain a more detailed picture of the network development. We used the 
software package ORA1  to structure the data.  
The metrics from the DNA form the backbone for the analysis of the sensemaking process. 
To this end, we performed a qualitative analysis of the telephone conversations. This allowed us to 
identify which frames emerged, persisted or disappeared throughout the day, and how that was 
caused by both sensegiving and sensedemanding activities. First, we coded cues or occurrences 
that interrupted the expectations of actors regarding normal work practices. This is where actors 
collect and bracket information to get an initial sense of the interrupted situation (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2014). We then focused on how these events were categorized as interruptions to define 
a specific situation. Following Cornelissen et al (2014), we coded words and expressions within 
communication that cued or prompted a cognitive or schema of interpretation. In this step we 
also looked for the factors influencing sensemaking as mentioned in the literature, i.e. identity 
and emotions. In the final step, we identified the actions taken by actors based on the framing of 
the interrupted situation and how this fed into the next phase. This allowed us to detect whether 
and how frames are updated with the help of new information.      
4. Introduction to the situation
The Dutch railway system is managed by the government-owned organization ProRail, 
which manages the maintenance of the railway network, assigns capacity to the train operating 
companies (TOC) and monitors and controls all train movements. Maintenance has been 
outsourced to contractors, but is monitored by ProRail’s track managers and track inspectors. 
Railway traffic is controlled by thirteen regional traffic control centres. Regional traffic controllers 
optimize traffic flows within their own region and train dispatchers are responsible for safe rail 
traffic on the sections assigned to them. The management of the railway system is decentralized, 
with considerable local autonomy. Over the years, this has led to problems with local optimization 
and working at cross-purposes. A national control room, the Operational Control Centre Rail 
(OCCR), was established in 2010 to overcome such problems. In the OCCR, ProRail and Dutch 
Railways (by far the largest TOC in the Netherlands) monitor the railway system at the national 
level. We present the main actors in the Dutch railway system in Table 12.  
Table 1. 
The main actors involved in the case and a description of their role 
Role Abbreviation Role description Track Manager  WD 2 AM Is responsible for the quality of the railway infrastructure in order to assure safe usage Track Inspector - Supports the track manager by monitoring deviations and consulting him on corrective measures 
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Regional Traffic Controller Traffic Control Is responsible for the optimization of rail traffic flows in specific geographical areas. Train Dispatcher - Is responsible for the safe allocation of railway tracks to trains, primarily by using signalling and controlling switches National Asset Manager Coordinator  RIIB Monitors incidents, malfunctions and maintenance work and their impact on railway traffic at national level in the OCCR National Traffic Coordinator  RLVL Manages railway traffic at national level in the OCCR National Traffic Controller LVL Monitors the railway traffic on the main corridors of the railway system in the OCCR Power switching and monitoring centre SMC Takes calls on malfunctioning infrastructure and reports them to the contractors National Train Operating Coordinator LBC Manages the train operations for Dutch Railways at national level in the OCCR. Team Leader TL Team leader of the regional traffic control centres Node Coordinator NC Manages the shunting of trains at the large stations 
We began our study when a regular inspection was conducted by the contractor in area A on 
February 19th, 2014. The contractor noticed that two rail tracks did not meet the safety standards 
defined by ProRail. This did not mean that there was an immediately unsafe situation, but action 
was required to assess the situation. The contractor informed the track inspector about these 
deviations at 8:30. At the same moment the track inspector was reading his monthly reports on 
four double switches (2 in area A and 2 in area B), which had been showing deviations from safety 
standards for some time. These switches were being monitored on a monthly basis. Large-scale 
renewal of switches had been scheduled for some years, but they had been postponed due to a 
lack of funds. Subsequently, the track team started to deviate from their own safety rules and had 
to increasingly rely on their own expert judgments. Audits conducted by the Human Environment 
and Transport Inspectorate, in which they rebuked the maintenance team for not following their 
own rules, served as a wake-up call. This made the team aware of their own behaviour and 
changed their perspective on how to apply safety standards. Consequently, the track inspector and 
track manager decided that the switches and tracks should immediately be taken out of service 
and that large-scale renewal was the only viable option left.    
The formal procedures prescribe that train dispatchers should be notified immediately in the 
event that rail infrastructure is no longer safe to be used. This allows them to immediately take 
the required safety measures to prevent trains from running over the designated switches and 
tracks. The SMC should provide the train dispatchers with a specific reference number (RVO 
number), which is also used by the contractor. In view of the huge impact of their decision on the 
train service, the track inspector and track manager decided that the switches and tracks could be 
used until 18:00 to give themselves and others some preparation time. Hence, they decided to 
issue an early warning to the OCCR, to let them coordinate the whole process. As the track 
inspector explained: “In my opinion when you call the OCCR, which is our big institute, the 
coordination centre, they will manage things. They will make sure that the loop is closed and the 
train dispatchers are informed.”   
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However, the train dispatchers were not officially informed about the switches and tracks 
until just half an hour before the 18:00 deadline. Minutes before the deadline, the train dispatcher 
in area A deemed it necessary to suspend all rail traffic in the middle of rush hour. We will 
analyze the events leading up to this decision.  
5. Identifying key moments and actors in the process
We start our analysis by making a reconstruction of the flows of information between the 
different teams and organizations leading up to the decision. The quantitative network analysis 
acts as a first stage in our research to identify key moments and actors in the process, which serve 
as important starting points for a more in-depth qualitative analysis of how the information was 
processed. We identified a total of 156 instances of information sharing among 40 actors. To 
grasp the dynamics in the spreading of information we created six time slices of half an hour each 
(from 15:15 until 18:15). Each time slice shows all the information exchanges between actors or 
nodes in that period. Network graphs of each time slice, showing the development of the 
communication network over time, are presented in Figures 4 through 9. In the figures each node 
represents an individual performing a specific role in the process. The round nodes are actors of 
traffic management, the square nodes are asset management, triangular nodes are Dutch 
Railways and the diamond-shaped nodes are contractors. The arrows show who provided whom 
with information during that specific time period.   
We then used several network metrics to quantitatively assess the development of the 
network over time.  As Figure 1 shows, the number of actors involved and interactions fluctuated 
throughout the process, with a peak in the number of interactions at time slice 6 (17:45-18:14). 
The spike in the number of actors involved and information exchange between time slices 2 and 3 
(15:45-16:44), as well as the sudden drop at T4 (16:45-17:14), are especially remarkable and need 
further investigation.  
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Figure 1: Number of actors and interactions throughout the process.
Figure 2 shows the density and betweenness centralization scores of the networks. Density 
describes the number of links between nodes as opposed to the maximum number of linkages 
possible.  A dense communication structure enables a free flow of information between actors 
and can therefore facilitate coordination. Furthermore, a dense network also gives actors more 
opportunities to engage in sensemaking dialogue with others. As Figure 2 shows, density 
increased slightly during T1 – T2, but then fell to five percent at T5. Overall, the density is very 
low, which shows that many actors were not directly communicating with each other, i.e. the 
network was rather sparse, resulting in long communication lines. Betweenness centrality 
measures the extent to which a particular node lies in-between the other nodes in the network. 
The more central an actor is, the more control he or she has over information flows through the 
network and the more able to coordinate group processes (Hossain, Wu, & Chung, 2006). 
Networks with a high betweenness centralization thus have one node or a small group of nodes 
that have more potential to control the flows of information. Figure 2 shows that the network 
features high centralization at T1 and T2, before becoming more decentralized in the following 
time periods. The overall low percentages as opposed to the theoretical maximum indicate that 
there was little potential for a single actor or a small group to control the information flows. This 
was confirmed by one of the actors.  
National Coordinator Rail: “It is true that everyone had received some information, but they were just 
bits and pieces of information. We all knew that something was going on, but there was no one in control 
of the process.” 
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Figure 2: Density and betweenness centralization of the network over time.
It is also important to identify the most central nodes or actors in each time slice. Table 2 
shows the three most central actors based on their degree and betweenness centralities. Although 
there are differences in the rankings between the time slices, some actors show a high level of 
consistency in terms of centrality. These are the National Asset Manager Coordinator (RIIB 2), 
National Traffic Controller (LVL 1), and the National Traffic Coordinator (RLVL) in the OCCR and 
the Regional Traffic Controller of area A. Their consistency can be seen as an indication of their 
ability to digest and distribute information in different time periods (Wolbers et al., 2013). As 
such their central position in the network makes them important in terms of sensedemanding 
and sensegiving and we should therefore follow up on the role of these actors in the sensemaking 
process. 
Table 2.  
The most central actors per time slice in terms of degree and betweenness centrality 
Time Slice Degree Betweenness  
T1 
(15:15-15:44) 
1. RIIB 2 2. RLVL 3. WD 2 AM 
1. RIIB 2 2. RLVL 3. LBC 
T2 
(15:45-16:14) 1. RIIB 2 2. 3. 
1. RIIB 2 2. 3. 
T3 
(16:15-16:44) 1. Traffic Control A 2. RLVL 3. LVL 1 
1. Traffic Control A 2. LVL 1 3. RIIB 2 
T4 
(16:45-17:14) 1. RIIB 2 2. Traffic Control A 1. Traffic Control A 2. LVL 1 
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3. LVL 1 3. RLVL 
T5 
(17:15-17:44) 
1. WD RBI VL 2. RIIB 2 3. RLVL 
1. WD RBI VL 2. RLVL 3. RIIB 2 
T6 
(17:45-18:14) 
1. RLVL 2. LVL 1 3. RIIB 2 
1. RLVL 2. Train Dispatcher A1 3. RIIB 2 
Finally, we created a two-mode network on the basis of time slices of fifteen minutes to 
identify the critical moments of coordination in more detail. Critical periods are the ones when 
many actors are connected together and information can be shared to create a common 
understanding. Figure 3 shows the time slices ordered according to their normalized degree and 
betweenness centrality. Degree centrality shows the number of direct ties that a node has. In this 
case nodes are the time slices and direct ties indicate the number of actors sharing information 
during that time period. For betweenness centrality calculations, we follow Wolbers et al., (2013), 
by understanding time slices with a high betweenness centrality as critical periods in which actors 
could relay information to others since they were only linked to each other at that time period. 
Figure 3: Time slices degree and betweenness centrality in a two-mode network 
Figure 3 shows that time slice 5 (16:15-16:29) features the highest degree centrality, with half 
of the actors involved during this time period. This means that the spike in the number of actors 
communicating occurred quite early on in the process. The large gap between the degree 
centrality of T4 and T5, represents a sudden increase in the number of actors involved during T5, 
as could also be seen in Figure 1. During time slices T6 and T8 (16:30-17:14) there is a drop in the 
number of actors communicating, with the time slices T9-T12 (17:15-18:14) showing once again a 
large number of actors present in these time periods. The betweenness scores show that time 
slices 5 and 9-12 were critical periods of information sharing and collective sensemaking. We 
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used these critical periods to divide the whole process into specific episodes of collective 
sensemaking to study how actors make sense of a situation, the actions they subsequently 
undertake, and the revisions that may be made to these interpretations. 
Figure 4:  Time Slice 1 (15:15-15:44)
Figure 5:  Time Slice 2 (15:45-16:14) 
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Figure 6:  Time Slice 3 (16:15-16:44) 
Figure 7:  Time Slice 4 (16:45-17:14) 
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Figure 8:  Time Slice 5 (17:15-17:44) 
Figure 9:  Time Slice 6 (17:45-18:14) 
6. Making sense of the decision to stop the train service
Having covered the structural and quantitative features, it is now time to turn to the content of the 
communication, i.e. the sensemaking processes. Table 3 describes the process leading to the train 
dispatchers’ decision to stop the train service. This table is based on the one Cornelissen et al. 
(2014) developed for their analysis of sensemaking in the Stockwell Shooting. Using the findings 
from the DNA, we divided the process into three episodes. The first episode started with the first 
phone call from the Track Manager to the Asset Management Coordinator (RIIB) in the OCCR 
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and ended at time slice four (Figures 3, time 16:14) when the schematics with all the details were 
sent to the OCCR. Episode 2 started at T5 (16:15), when there was a sudden peak in the number 
of actors and interactions, marking the start of the official procedure. The second episode ended 
at T8 (17:14), when it was discovered that no one had taken responsibility to inform the train 
dispatchers. The third episode consists of time slice T9-12 (17:15-18:14) during which there was 
considerable communication. It started with the Track Inspector informing the train dispatchers 
and ended with the decision by the train dispatchers in area A to suspend the rail traffic during 
rush hour. For each episode we looked at how the key actors (as identified in Table 2) tried to 
make sense of the disrupting events or how they shaped the meaning construction of others 
(sensegiving). The last column describes the actions that followed from the initial sense made by 
the key actors, from which a new cycle of sensemaking commenced.      
Table 3. 
Overview of the episodes of sensemaking among key actors following the decision to take several rail tracks and switches out of 
service, and outcomes. 
Time Event Key Actor(s) Sensemaking Actions/ Outcome 
08:30 The Track Inspector 
receives the information 
that two rail tracks do 
not meet the safety 
standards, while reading 
the monthly 
maintenance reports on 
four switches which 
have deviated from the 
standard for quite some 
time.  
Track 
Inspector 
The Track Inspector feels that he 
can no longer look away and that 
concrete measures have to be 
taken, given the recent audits by 
the inspectorate and the 
worsened measurement results 
for the switches.     
The Track Inspector decides 
to consult with his superior, 
the Track Manager. 
10:30 -
13:00 
The Track Inspector 
discusses the 
measurement results 
with the Track Manager. 
Track 
Inspector and 
Track 
Manager 
After a long debate the Track 
Inspector and Track Manager 
conclude that it is too great a risk 
to continue using the switches 
and tracks. Hence, they should 
be taken out of service, but not 
immediately given the impact 
this would have on the train 
service.  
The Track Inspector and 
Track Manager start  giving 
the other parties in the rail 
system an early warning that 
the switches and tracks will 
be taken out of service at 
18:00. 
Episode 1: An early warning to the OCCR 
15:19 The Track Manager 
(WD 2 AM) gives an 
early warning to the 
Asset Management 
Coordinator in the 
OCCR (RIIB). 
Track 
Manager and 
RIIB 
The RIIB was told that there was 
a very serious situation which 
would have a huge impact on the 
train service for which he used 
the term red flag often: “While 
you are seated, I want to share 
something with you (…). We have 
four red flags at this moment (in 
area A) and it’s pretty serious. 
There have been inspections last 
night, which showed major 
deviations from standard. In terms 
of responsibility we have to plant a 
red flag now.”   
The RIIB hands this 
information over to his 
colleague working the next 
shift (RIIB 2). 
15:27 The RIIB 2 asks for Track The RIIB does not hesitate to The RIIB warns his 
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more information on 
the situation from the 
Track Manager and 
schematics showing 
which switches and 
tracks should be taken 
out of service. 
Manager and 
RIIB 2 
abide by the track team’s 
decision and wants to stay in 
control of the situation: “It’s just 
a fact that this red flag will be 
planted, but when we have more 
information we will be able to 
prepare our logistics.”  
colleagues in the OCCR of 
Traffic Control and Dutch 
Railways (RLVL and RLBC).  
15:30 The RLVL calls the 
Team Leader of Traffic 
control area A.  
RLVL and 
Team Leader 
The RLVL feels that there is still 
not enough information to justify 
alarming the train dispatchers: 
“We don’t know exactly what is 
going on and why, so we first want 
to gather more information. 
Because imagine if it (red flag - 
authors) isn’t necessary, then we 
would be making a lot of fuss about 
nothing, and I would regret that.” 
The RLVL tells the Team 
Leader to keep his eyes and 
ears open, without letting the 
train dispatchers know 
anything. 
15:41 Nevertheless, the 
information that a red 
flag will be planted in 
the rail tracks reaches 
the regional control 
centre of Area A.   
Regional 
Traffic 
Controller and 
RLVL 
Both agree that since this is a 
safety issue, the train dispatcher 
should have been called first and 
that the OCCR shouldn’t be the 
first in the line of 
communication. They also find it 
strange that trains are still 
running over the switches and 
tracks despite the apparent safety 
risks.  
Both the Regional Traffic 
Controller and the RLVL still 
believe it to be a regular 
situation in which a 
mechanic has judged the 
switches and rail track as no 
longer safe and that the train 
dispatcher will be called 
anytime soon.  
15:57 The RIIB receives 
schematics with details 
on the four switches 
and two tracks and 
discusses them with the 
Track Manager. 
RIIB and 
Track 
Manager 
The Track Manager once more 
warns that there are safety risks 
and that they actually should 
have acted immediately, but that 
they have given a deferment until 
6 pm: “You know they have been 
running (over the switches and 
tracks) all morning, so I expect 
them to hold for another couple of 
hours. However, if the Inspectorate 
saw these values, we would get a big 
fine.”  
The RIIB appreciates the 
postponement of the red 
flags in order to keep the 
train service in control. He 
shares the latest information 
with his colleagues in the 
OCCR during the standard 
meeting at the beginning of 
their shifts. 
Episode 2: The official procedure is started 
16:18-
16:43 
The Track Inspector 
calls the SMC to start 
the official procedure.  
Track 
Inspector and 
SMC 
The Track Inspector enumerates 
which switches and tracks should 
no longer be used after 6 pm and 
that the surrounding switches 
should be locked to prevent 
trains from passing over the 
switches. When the SMC asks 
who will inform the train 
dispatchers, the Track Inspector 
states that they have informed 
the OCCR and thus the train 
dispatchers should be aware of 
the situation and preparations 
should be ongoing to adjust the 
train service.    
Based on advice from the 
SMC it is decided to follow 
the simpler RVO procedure, 
instead of the more time-
consuming BUTA procedure, 
the latter being the normal 
procedure in the case of 
deferred maintenance work. 
In contrast to what the RVO 
procedure prescribes, the 
SMC believes they have no 
role in informing the train 
dispatchers about the 
situation. 
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16:23- 
16:29 
Once again information 
on the red flags reaches 
the traffic control 
centres of areas A and B 
from the train operating 
companies. Both 
regional traffic control 
centres are surprised to 
receive this information 
indirectly and to hear 
that the red flag has 
been deferred until 6 
pm. 
Regional 
Traffic 
Controllers of 
areas A & B 
and the 
National 
Traffic 
Controller 
(LVL).  
The National Traffic Controller 
assures the regional traffic 
controllers that the normal RVO 
procedure will be followed: “We 
expect a phone call from you later 
on that the train dispatchers have 
been informed on what will be 
taken out of service at 6 pm. I just 
received a whole bunch of 
information, but said sorry let them 
speak with the train dispatcher.”   
The RLVL and LVL feel that 
they have no role in the 
process until the train 
dispatchers have been 
informed. They therefore 
decide not to communicate 
with the regional traffic 
controllers until the train 
dispatchers have been 
informed and it is clear 
which switches should be 
taken out of service.    
16:29 By now the train 
dispatchers in area A 
are starting to look for 
confirmation of the 
‘troubling messages’ 
they have received about 
several red flags with 
the SMC 
Train 
Dispatcher 
and SMC 
The SMC can’t give the train 
dispatcher more information and 
instead blames the train 
dispatcher for acting on 
rumours. He assures the train 
dispatcher that official 
procedures and lines of 
communication will be followed.  
The train dispatchers have 
the feeling that, given the 
many rumours, other actors 
have more information on 
the switches and tracks and 
that they are intentionally 
being excluded from the 
process: “I got the impression 
that everyone knew what was 
going on and we, the train 
dispatchers, knew nothing! 
Who is responsible for safety? 
And how is it possible that we 
can use the switches until 6 
pm?”   
16:30  The RIIB asks the Back 
Office of ProRail to 
make a logging in the 
communication system 
with the exact numbers 
of the switches and 
tracks that have to be 
taken out of service, 
which can be read by 
the regional traffic 
controllers.   
Regional 
Traffic 
Controllers, 
Train 
Dispatchers, 
National 
Traffic 
Controller 
The regional traffic control 
rooms are still in doubt as to 
whether the information in the 
communication system is correct 
and if so, in which position the 
switches will be locked. The latter 
is of great importance in terms of 
rail capacity. Hence, they find it 
difficult to formulate a 
contingency plan. The train 
dispatchers in area A even show 
reluctance to seek solutions, as 
long as they are not informed.    
Given the high amount of 
uncertainty it is decided to 
prepare firm measures in 
order to stay in control of the 
train service.  
17:08 After waiting and 
inquiring with the 
regional control rooms 
if they have received 
more details on the red 
flags, the RLVL urges 
the RIIB to ask the SMC 
when they will inform 
the train dispatchers. 
RIIB and 
SMC 
Here there is a clash between the 
two different frames of the 
situation held by the SMC and 
the RIIB. While the RIIB believes 
that the SMC will inform the 
train dispatchers in accordance 
with formal procedures, the SMC 
is under the impression that the 
OCCR has already informed the 
train dispatchers.       
Both parties believe they are 
not authorized to impose 
restrictions on the usage of 
the switches and tracks. They 
conclude that the Track 
Inspector or a contractor does 
have the authority and 
therefore should do the job. 
The RIIB calls the Track 
Manager to let the Track 
Inspector inform the train 
dispatchers.  
Episode 3: The train service is stopped 
17:27 The Track Inspector 
calls a train dispatcher 
in area A to inform her 
Train 
Dispatcher 
area A and 
Since the train dispatchers have 
been using the switches and 
tracks for the last couple of hours 
The train dispatchers in area 
A decide not to cooperate and 
continue to operate the 
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of the situation. The 
Track Inspector 
mentions the switches 
and tracks that should 
be taken out of service 
at 18:00 and indicates 
that the RVOs will be 
provided shortly. He 
also emphasizes that 
there are safety issues 
concerning the switches 
and tracks. 
Track 
Inspector  
they believe that there is no 
immediate risk and therefore do 
not feel obliged to cooperate. 
Cooperating is also seen as an 
invitation to the track team to let 
them deviate from the 
procedures more often. 
Moreover, the Track Inspector is 
not seen as an expert who can tell 
them to take the rail 
infrastructure out of service: 
“Only experts can tell me if there is 
something wrong with the 
infrastructure (…). We need to hear 
it from an expert, which is a 
mechanic or the SMC.” 
switches and tracks. The 
Track Inspector is told to get 
in contact with the Team 
Leader of area A.    
17:30 The Track Inspector 
calls a train dispatcher 
in area B to inform him 
of the situation. Once 
more, the Track 
Inspector says the 
switches that should be 
taken out of service at 
18:00 and that the RVOs 
will be provided shortly. 
He also mentions that 
there are safety issues 
with the switches and 
that all approach 
switches need to be 
locked. 
Train 
Dispatcher 
area B and 
Track 
Inspector 
For the train dispatcher it is 
inconceivable that the red flags 
have been deferred until 18:00 on 
the basis of its impact on the 
train service and workload of the 
operators, thereby giving less 
priority to the role of safety. The 
train dispatcher feels it is too 
great a risk to let another train 
pass over one of the switches, 
given the information provided 
by the Track Inspector.    
Immediately after the phone 
call from the Track Inspector, 
the train dispatcher in area B 
decides to take the switches 
out of service. In other words: 
30 minutes before the 
deadline. 
17:40  A Regional Manager 
(WD VL RBI) calls the 
Team Leader of area A, 
but gets put through to 
one of the train 
dispatchers (A1). 
Regional 
Manager and 
Train 
Dispatcher 
The Regional Manager asks the 
train dispatcher what they need 
to take the switches and tracks 
out of service at 18:00. They are, 
however, unable to create a 
shared understanding of the 
situation. The train dispatcher 
expresses a lot of negative 
emotions, as she feels they are 
being left on their own: “The 
whole course of events is flawed and 
everyone is just actively cooperating. 
It (taking the switches and tracks 
out of service) should happen no 
matter what. This is just 
ridiculous!” 
The train dispatcher tells the 
Regional Manager to get in 
contact with the team leader 
as she refuses to cooperate 
17:47 A mechanic calls a train 
dispatcher in area A to 
tell him that two 
switches have to be 
taken out of service 
because they don´t 
meet safety standards.  
However, the 
Mechanic and 
Train 
Dispatcher in 
area A 
The train dispatcher repeatedly 
asks whether he can use the 
switch since a train is 
approaching it, but the mechanic 
can’t give any absolute certainty. 
Given the high amount of 
uncertainty the train dispatcher 
is no longer certain whether the 
The train dispatchers see the 
mechanic as an expert on 
whose judgement they 
should act. However, since 
the mechanic also can’t 
provide exact details, the train 
dispatcher decides to let the 
train make an emergency 
stop as he believes it is no 
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information he received 
from the SMC is very 
sketchy and he is still 
unsure in what position 
the switches should be 
locked at 6 pm. At that 
moment a train 
approaches one of the 
switches mentioned by 
the mechanic.   
switches in his area of control are 
safe to be operated.     
longer safe.  
17:54 The train dispatcher in 
area A calls the SMC to 
check the information 
he received from the 
mechanic. 
Train 
Dispatchers 
area A and 
SMC 
The SMC assures the train 
dispatcher that the message on 
the switches and tracks comes 
from an expert, the Track 
Inspector. Nevertheless, the train 
dispatchers feel that there is too 
much uncertainty regarding 
which switches are safe and 
which ones are not, and that they 
are thus unable to guarantee safe 
rail traffic. Train dispatcher: 
“Look, a situation is safe or unsafe! 
How is it possible that the people 
responsible for safety know nothing, 
at least not officially?”  
The dispatchers once more 
reject the Track Inspector as 
an expert, along with his 
information. They decide to 
suspend all rail traffic around 
the two major train stations 
in their area of control until 
they receive the correct 
information from a 
contractor, along with the 
official reference numbers, 
according to formal 
procedures. Consequently, 
there are no services between 
various main cities during 
rush hour.  
7. Discussion
As the summaries in Table 3 show, even though it was rooted in good intentions, the track 
team’s decision to give an early warning to the OCCR created an ambiguous situation for the 
other actors in the system. The early warning violated expectations in several ways. Firstly, an 
early warning is not a regular practice in the Dutch railway sector. Secondly, although the track 
team designated the situation as a ‘red flag’, they also allowed a six-hour delay. This sent a 
contradictory message. Thirdly, informing the OCCR created a top-down flow of information, 
which deviated from the formalized bottom-up approach for maintenance work. In such 
situations people have to ask themselves and others: “what is going on?” As the case has shown, 
the term ‘red flag’ played a very important role in the sensemaking process. A red flag is jargon 
for a situation in which the safe usage of a railway track or switch can no longer be guaranteed 
and so trains are forbidden to run over the track or switch. By framing their actions as placing 
several red flags the track team thus created the impression of an immediate safety risk. As one of 
the managers explained: “A red flag can be like a red rag to a bull. A red flag means an unsafe 
situation”.   
Labels, like the term red flag, carry their own implications for action. They focus attention 
and shrink the number of possibilities as to what is occurring (Weick, 2001). In this case the 
term red flag triggered a routine procedure in which the train dispatchers should take the lead 
according to formal procedures and be informed by a mechanic or the SMC. This frame was 
dominant among the actors in the OCCR throughout the entire process and was reinforced 
through their communication and actions. For instance, there was a strong commitment to 
restoring action to familiar practices, i.e. to make sure that the train dispatchers were officially 
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notified by the SMC or a mechanic in order to start the official procedure. This frame was also 
shared with the regional traffic control centres. Even when the regional traffic control centres 
confronted the national traffic controllers with the absence of an official notification and the 
contradictory signals they had received, the national traffic controllers repeatedly reinforced the 
frame of a routine procedure. In fact, they decided to reduce communication with the regional 
control centres (as could be seen in figure 1, fourth time slice) when confusion started to increase, 
agitation grew among the regional operators, and communication became mainly focused on 
blaming instead of problem solving.  
The dominance of the frame also explains why the National Asset Management Coordinator 
and the National Traffic Control Coordinator did not use their central position in the network 
(Table 2) to provide others with this crucial information, despite them having full details on the 
switches and tracks. They simply did not believe that it was their role, or that they had the 
authority to do so. Instead, communication and actions were aimed at restoring standard 
procedures, which conflicted with the intentions of the track team for an improvised course of 
action with the OCCR coordinating the process and informing the regional control centres. The 
latter framing of the situation was also shared with the SMC by the track inspector. As a result of 
these different interpretations of the situation, actors started to make wrong assumptions about 
what others knew and which actions they would take. Consequently, the task of informing the 
train dispatchers was not assigned to anyone. In addition, the strategy of waiting until the train 
dispatchers had been officially notified was severely undermined by the many rumours that were 
circulating, because other actors in the system were checking, updating and revising their sense 
of events. The time slices show that the train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers in areas A 
and B were approached several times by train operating companies seeking confirmation of the 
‘rumours’ they had heard about the red flags (Figures 4 through 9).   
However, the train dispatchers and regional traffic controllers could not officially confirm 
any information to the train operating companies, as they had still not been officially notified of 
the situation. The sensedemanding of the train operating companies caused a chain of reactions, 
which explains the sudden increase in the number of interactions between time slices 2 and 3 
(figure 1). More and more actors became involved and information on the red flags spread through the network uncoordinatedly. With information being dispersed among people and 
locations, sensemaking became fragmented, i.e. diverse accounts of the situation existed among 
the actors in the railway system. As a result, the train dispatchers felt isolated and lost grasp of 
what was happening. Train dispatchers rely on a strong dichotomy between safe or unsafe, as they 
are held responsible for safe operation. Hence, for them it is very difficult to understand that they 
are running trains over a piece of infrastructure, the safety of which cannot be guaranteed. 
Although they knew that there were issues with the safety of some switches and tracks, they had 
not received any official information or a reference number, and therefore they could not fulfil 
their role.  
What explains the difference in response between the train dispatchers in areas A and B? 
The telephone conversations revealed that there were considerable negative emotions among the 
train dispatchers in area A, and this negativity increased during the day. These emotions were 
fuelled by the fact that critical information was not shared with them. This was not only seen as a 
threat to their social identity, but also created a state of anxiety which was widely shared among 
the train dispatchers in the control room. The literature on sensemaking points to the importance 
of emotions (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Maitlis, Vogus, & Lawrence, 2013; Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014). These studies show that emotions are an important factor in individual and 
collective sensemaking. Negative emotions, in particular, are contagious and can easily spread 
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among group members (Bartunek, Rousseau, Rudolph, & DePalma, 2006). In this case, a 
collective belief that emerged among the train dispatchers of area A was that non-compliance and 
strictly following procedures was the best course of action. Hence, they continued to operate the 
switches and tracks and rejected the track inspector as an expert. Such negative emotions were 
less prominent in area B. An important explanatory difference is that area B had a team leader on-
site, while in area A the team leader was on call. As the team leader of area B explained: “After 
receiving the phone call from the RLVL I was busy tempering emotions, saying ‘Guys keep on going, don’t 
get carried away by emotion because of this uncertainty about what we can and can’t do. Make sure that 
the trains keep running!’”     
The lack of contextual information made it difficult for the team leader of area A, who was on 
call, to identify the specific coordination issues and to recognize the negative emotions emerging 
among his train dispatchers. In area A, the regional traffic controller played an important role in 
the line of communication between the train dispatchers and the OCCR, as can be seen in the 
graphs and Table 2. The regional traffic controller, however, was very busy with his preparations 
to adjust the train service and showed resistance in his communication. Therefore, national traffic 
control did not want to antagonize him. Instead, new actors who were able to circumvent the 
formal lines of communication, such as the regional manager, stepped in to help create some 
common ground between the track team and the train dispatchers and to mediate in their 
conflict. However, the regional manager failed to develop a congruent understanding of the 
situation with the train dispatcher and actually contributed to the growing negative emotions. In 
the end the lack of a common ground between the track team and the train dispatchers resulted in 
the decision by the train dispatchers in both areas A and B not to comply (each in their own 
manner) with the track inspector’s six o’clock deadline.   
The unexpected split-second decision taken by the train dispatchers of area A to suspend the 
rail traffic, also cascaded into area B, where the dispatchers and regional traffic controllers were 
struggling to keep the traffic flowing. Large service cuts had to be made in order to cope with the 
reduced capacity in an orderly fashion. As a result, many passengers were stranded. Altogether, it 
took more than an hour for the train dispatchers in area A to receive the correct information and 
reference numbers so that they could gradually restart the train service. A nightly inspection of 
the switches by ProRail revealed that three out of the four switches could be put back into service 
by applying new broadened safety standards that were scheduled to enter into effect two months 
later. 
8. Conclusion
We have demonstrated how and why the actors involved were unable to create a shared 
understanding on which to base coordinated action. The OCCR’s framing of the situation as a 
normal procedure on the basis of the term ‘red flag’ and their desire to restore action to familiar 
practices was in conflict with the track team’s intention to find an improvised way of managing 
the process. We have shown how these different understandings of the situation accumulated 
over time, leading to inconsistent actions, incorrect assumptions and a lack of effective 
communication. Our DNA results show how information spread among the actors in the system, 
rapidly and uncoordinatedly. Consequently, actors held different pieces of information and 
created fragmented accounts of the situation. We found that informal and indirect 
communication (sensedemanding) negatively influenced the process, as it increased uncertainty 
among the train dispatchers about the course of action to be followed and their role in the 
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process. We observed two different responses to this uncertainty and the time pressure: one in 
which procedures were strictly followed and the track inspector was excluded as an authority, 
which eventually resulted in the decision to stop the train service (area A), and one in which safety 
concerns triggered improvisation (area B).   
The findings in this research confirm earlier work on networks of teams, in that there are 
additional challenges for effective coordinated action between multiple teams with a variety of 
skills, functions, and knowledge (Shuffler, Rico, & Salas, 2014; Zaccaro et al., 2012). In order for 
these teams to work together effectively, it is important to develop shared mental models on 
expected behaviour patterns concerning task procedures, team and team member behaviours and 
needs, and patterns of communication (Rentsch & Staniewicz, 2012). Shared mental models thus 
help individuals to choose actions that are coordinated with other team members. As we show in 
our study, failure to develop a common set of assumptions and expectations may lead to role 
violations, communication failures, and even conflicts between teams. Building shared mental 
models in a large system with many diverse teams can, however, be a challenge. It is therefore 
important to ensure that common understanding is established around a congruent framing of 
the situation through collective sensemaking (Cornelissen et al., 2014).     
However, strict adherence to a framing can also have a negative outcome. Commitment to 
frames reduces the number of cues that are considered and so it ties actors to a certain repertoire 
of actions and assumptions regarding the behaviour of others (Cornelissen et al., 2014). In our 
case, adherence to the initial framing of the situation by the actors in the OCCR, and their 
attempts to restore procedures, along with the long and indirect lines of communication, created 
blind spots that led people to miss the signs that they were not dealing with a routine situation. 
Hence, it is important to be able to update frames when dealing with ambiguous events (Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010). This particularly applies to networks of teams. As teams are geographically 
separated it is often difficult to quickly identify misunderstandings and prevent escalation. Hence, 
it is important that actors feel free to doubt and question the information they receive from their 
partners and to take the time to deliberate with them on the framing, instead of blaming each 
other for not following procedures or diminishing communication (Weick, 1993; Weick, 2005). 
This is not something that is easily achieved, but in the long run it can help to improve the 
adaptive capacity of the system. 
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1 See Schipper, Gerrits & Koppenjan (2015) for more details on the use of DNA and ORA in analyzing railway disruptions. 
2 See Schipper, Gerrits & Koppenjan (2015) for more details on traffic control in the Dutch railway system 
